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ficient to protect the bank because the
policy did not address sexual harassment.
The policy therefore failed to notify employees of the employer's interest in avoiding that form of discrimination. Second,
the mere existence of a grievance procedure
within the bank was insufficient to protect
the bank against liability because the procedure required an employee to complain
to her supervisor first. In this case, the
employee would have had to complain to
the alleged perpetrator, which she understandably failed to do. The Court left the
door open regarding the rulings on employer's liability in the future. It even suggested that if the employer's "procedures
were better calculated to encourage victims
of harassment to come forward" the employer may be able to avoid liability. ld.
at 2409.
Justice Marshall delivered the concurring opinion, joined by Justices Brennan,
Blackmun, and Stevens. They agreed that
workplace sexual harassment is illegal and
violates Title VII. As regards employer
liability, however, the justices concluded
that "sexual harassment by a supervisor of
an employee under his supervision, leading to a discriminatory work environment,
should be imputed to the employer for
Title VII purposes, regardless of whether
the employee gave 'notice' of the offense."
ld. at 2411.
Based on the Court's holding there may
be problems in the future concerning proof
of whether conduct was "unwelcome" or
"voluntary." Also, the issue of employer
liability in sexual harassment cases has
been left open, although the Court has
indicated that future cases should apply
agency principles.

-Libby C. Reamer

Bethel School District No. 403 v.
Fraser: FIRST AMENDMENT DOES
NOT PREVENT SCHOOL DISTRICT
FROM DISCIPLINING STUDENT
FOR GIVING OFFENSIVELY LEWD
AND INDECENT SPEECH
In Tinker v. Des Moines Independent
Community School District, 393 U.S. 503
(1969), the Supreme Court of the United
States acknowledged that students do not
"shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate." ld. at 506. Recently, however,
the Court held that a school district acted
entirely within its permissible authority in
imposing sanctions upon a high school
student in response to the student's offensively lewd and indecent speech given at a
school assembly. The Court held that such
speech was not protected by the first amendment. Bethel School District No. 403 v.
Fraser, 106 S.Ct. 3159 (1986).
Matthew Fraser was a high school student in Bethel, Washington. At a school
assembly attended by about 600 students,
many of whom were 14 years ofage, Fraser
delivered a speech in support of a candidate for student government office. The
speech referred to the candidate in terms
of explicit sexual metaphors, employing
such phrases as "he's firm in his pants ...
his character is firm," "a man who takes his
point and pounds it in," and "a man who
will go to the very end - even the climax,
for each and every one of you." ld. at 3167.
Students at the assembly hooted and yelled
during the speech, mimicking the sexual activities alluded to in the speech, while
others appeared to be shocked and embarrassed. Prior to Fraser's delivery of the
speech, two of his teachers with whom he
had discussed the contents of his speech
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in advance, advised him that it was inappropriate and should not be given.
The day after he delivered the speech,
Fraser was asked to report to the assistant
principal's office. At the meeting, Fraser
was given notice that he was being charged
with violating the school's disruptive conduct rule, which prohibited conduct that
substantially interfered with the educational process, including the use of obscene, profane language or gestures. After
being given an opportunity to explain his
conduct, in which he admitted that he delibenitely used sexual innuendos in the
speech, Fraser was suspended for three
days. In addition, he was informed that his
name would be removed from a list of candidates on a ballot for graduation speakers.
Fraser initiated a grievance of the disciplinary action through the school district's grievance procedures. The hearing
officer affirmed the decision but Fraser
was allowed to return to school after serving only two days of his suspension. Fraser,
joined by his father as guardian ad litem,
then filed a civil rights action in federal
district court, seeking injunctive relief
and monetary damages under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. The district court, holding that
the sanctions violated the student's rights
under the first and fourteenth amendments, awarded Fraser monetary damages
and enjoined the school district from preventing him from speaking at graduation.
Fraser was elected graduation speaker and
spoke at the commencement ceremonies.
The United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district
court judgment, rejecting the argument
that the nomination speech had a disruptive effect on the educational process. The
court also rejected the argument that the
school district had an interest in protecting
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students, most of whom were minors,
from lewd and indecent language in a
school-sponsored setting.
The Supreme Court of the United States
reversed. Chief Justice Burger, speaking
for the majority, distinguished Tinker as
markedly different from the facts in this
case. Specifically, that the penalties imposed on Fraser were unrelated to any
political viewpoint. Moreover, the Chief
Justice emphasized that "[i]n upholding
the student's right to engage in a nondisruptive, passive expression of a political
viewpoint in Tinker, this Court was careful
to note that the case 'did not concern speech
or action that intrudes upon the work of
the schools or the rights ofother students."
106 S.Ct. at 3163. It was against this background that the Court considered the level
of First Amendment protection accorded
to Fraser's nomination speech.
The Court first discussed the role and
purpose of the American public school
system. The Court stated that the objectives of public education were to inculcate
"fundamental values necessary to the maintenance of a democratic political system."
Id. at 3164, (quoting Ambach v. Norwick,
441 U.S. 68, 76-77 (1979». Conceding
that these "fundamental values" included
tolerance of unpopular views, both political and religious, the Court determined
that "[t]he undoubted freedom to advocate unpopular and controversial views in
schools and classrooms must be balanced
against society's countervailing interest in
teaching students the boundaries ofsocially
appropriate behavior." Id. at 3164. Moreover, the Court declared that while the
first amendment guarantees adults wide
protection in matters of public verbal expression, it does not follow that because
adults are not prohibited from using offensive forms of expression when making a
political point, that children in a public
school must be given the same latitude.
Secondly, the Court expressed unequivocally that one of the functions of public
school education is "to prohibit the use of
vulgar and offensive terms in public discourse." Id. at 3165. The Court reasoned
that the "fundamental values necessary to
the maintenance of a democratic political
system" discourage the use of highly offensive terms. Furthermore, the Court indicated that the Constitution is void of any
language which prohibits the states from
deciding that certain expressions are inappropriate and subject to sanctions. Realizing that the inculcation of these fundamental values are truly the responsibility
of the schools, the Court left the determination of what speech was appropriate
in the classroom or assembly to the school
board.
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The Court then turned its attention to
frrstamendmentjurisprudencecon~g

limitations on free speech where the speech
is sexually explicit and reaches an unlimited audience, especially an audience including children. The Court acknowledged
that these cases recognize a concerned interest on the part of parents and school
authorities "to protect children - especially
those in a captive audience-from exposure
to sexually explicit, indecent, or lewd
speech." Id.; See Ginsberg v. New York,
390 U.S. 629 (1968); Board of Education
v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982). In addition,
the Court cited cases which recognize an
interest "in protecting minors from exposure to vulgar and offensive spoken language." 106 S.Ct. at 3165; See FCC v.
Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
Thus, the Court concluded that the first
amendment did not prevent the school
district from suspending Fraser in response to his offensively lewd' and indecent speech, and further concluded that to
permit such a speech would "undermine
the school's basic educational mission."
106 S.Ct. at 3166. Remarking that "[a]
high school assembly or classroom is no
place for a sexually explicit monologue directed towards an unsuspecting audience
of teenage students," the ChiefJustice concluded that "it was perfectly appropriate
for the school to disassociate itself to make
the point to the pupils that vulgar speech
and lewd conduct is wholly inconsistent
with the 'fundamental values' of public
school education." Id.
The Court's holding in Fraser dangerously limits a high school student's first
amendment right to free speech. Giving
school officials the unbridled discretion to
apply the nebulous standard of"indecency"
in controlling the speech of high school
students, certainly increases the risk of
cementing white, middle-class standards
for determining what is acceptable and
proper speech and behavior in the public
schools. Language considered "indecent"
in one segment of society may be common,
household usage in another. Freedom to
be different in one's individual manner of
expression is a core constitutional value.
The first amendment reflects the considered judgment of the Founding Fathers
that government shall not be permitted to
use their power to control individual selfexpression.
Finally, the Court characterizes Matthew
Fraser as a "confused boy" whose "lewd,
indecent, and offensive" speech could be
"seriously damaging to its less mature audience, many of whom were only 14 years
old and on the threshold of awareness of
human sexuality." 106 S.Ct. at 3165. The
Supreme Court obviously fails to consider

the everyday environment that these students live in. Fraser was speaking not to
children, but to young adults. Most high
school students are beyond the point of
being sheltered from the many sights and
sounds they encounter everyday. Although
school officials and parents may be offended by certain utterances and actions,
high school students, as young adults,
should be able to determine for themselves
whether such conduct is inappropriate and
whether it should be disciplined.
-Steven M. Schrier

Falwell v. Flynt: NEW YORK TIMES
"ACTUAL MALICE" STANDARD
DISTINGUISHED IN ACTION FOR
EMOTIONAL DISTRESS
In Falwell v. Flynt, Hustler Magazine,
Inc., and Flynt Distributing Co., Inc., _ _
F.2d __ (4th Cir. 1986), the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit held that the level of protection
available to a publisher in a suit by a public
figure for emotional distress arising from a
false publication is met by the recklessness
standard of the tort itse1£ The court further
held that a New York Times v. Sullivan,
376 U.S. 254 (1964), .analysis is not required. In so holding, the court affirmed
the decision by the United States District
Court for the Western District of Virginia.
In Falwell, the lawsuit arose out of an "ad
parody" that appeared in Hustler magazine, which attempted to satirize an advertising campaign for Campari Liqueur. In
the actual Campari advertisements, celebFities talk about their "first time," meaning
their fust encounter with Campari Liqueur,
but there is a double entendre with a sexual connotation. In the Falwell parody, he
is the celebrity in the advertisement which
contains his photograph and an interview
which is attributed to him. In this interview, Falwell allegedly details an incestuous rendezvous with his mother in an outhouse in Lynchburg, Virginia. Falwell's
mother is portrayed as a drunken and immoral woman and he is portrayed as a
hypocrite and a habitual drunkard. Falwell filed suit in the United States District
Court for the Western District of Virginia
alleging three theories ofliability: libel, invasion of privacy under Va. Code § 8.01-40
(1984), and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The district court dismissed
Falwell's invasion of privacy claim and the
jury returned a verdict for the defendants
on the libel claim, finding that no reasonable man would believe that the parody
was describing actual facts about Falwell.
On the emotional distress claim, the jury

